Efficiency and administrative regulation: the case of electoral systems in Peru and Ecuador

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dc.date.accessioned2023-04-05T12:48:38Z
dc.date.available2023-04-05T12:48:38Z
dc.date.issued2022
dc.description.abstractUsing an interdisciplinary analysis, this paper intends to describe the meanings and roles played by efficiency in public administration, from a legal-economic perspective. In line with the neo-institutional approach, legal-economic analysis is based on the premise that agents involved in the different levels of government make decisions according to the incentives they face, and so with legal rules. However, there are variables that impose costs and benefits, but can also cause externalities within the context of these decisions. We analyse how efficiency is applied in different contexts and administrative regulations, focusing on the electoral system. © 2022 Inderscience Publishers. All rights reserved.
dc.identifier.issn20447663
dc.identifier.urihttps://doi.org/10.1504/IJPLAP.2022.120662
dc.identifier.urihttp://146.190.124.33/handle/123456789/6456
dc.language.isoenges_ES
dc.publisherInderscience Publisherses_ES
dc.sourceCurrent Tropical Medicine Reports; Vol. 8 Núm. 4
dc.titleEfficiency and administrative regulation: the case of electoral systems in Peru and Ecuadores_ES
dc.typeinfo:eu-repo/semantics/articlees_ES
dc.type.versioninfo:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersion
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